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In recent years, CEO compensation has been a controversial topic in both China 
and the U.S. The causes of the large differences in individual compensations can no 
longer be simply determined by firm sizes and individual abilities. This research is 
inspired by Kaplan and Minton (2012), and approaches from a job security 
perspective to explain the differences in CEO compensations. In this study, I construct 
a logic relationship between CEO compensation and job security with a hope to 
explain the following questions: 1. Does job security affect CEO compensation? 2. In 
what ways do the firms compensate the CEOs when job security is absent? 3. Does 
the compensation for job security change under different circumstances and for 
different types of CEOs? 
To answer these questions, I, first, construct a logical relationship between CEO 
compensation and job security by using Principal-agent Theory, Risk Preference 
Theory, Search Theory and Matching Theory. On top it, I explain how job security 
would affect CEO’s compensation differently based on their risk preference and CEO 
job market condition. 
Second, I analyze the institutional backgrounds of China and the U.S., sum up 
the key events, and explain why they happened with a hope to find preliminary 
evidence of the correlation between CEO compensation and job security. From the 
institutional background analysis, I show that when CEOs’ benefits/incomes were at 
stake, they would adjust accordingly to avoid risks and demand for a more 
conservative pay structure that in terms of more cash pays and fixed bonuses. 
Lastly, I implement empirical studies by using data from both the U.S. and China. 
For the U.S. part of research, I study 2,914 CEO’s hiring contracts (and 1,143 
incentive plans) during 2000 to 2013 using the Execucomp and Incentive Lab 
databases. My main findings are as follows:  
First, I find that job security has a price. CEOs and the firm would trade pay for 
job security; CEOs are paid more in less secured jobs.  
















would demand a higher pay first. When the firms are able to provide a higher pay, 
CEO would then ask for a more secured pay structure, a severance agreement, and an 
incentive plan that is easier to achieve along with a shorter vesting period.  
Third, CEO risk preference has a significant impact on the compensation for job 
security. In general, only CEOs who are risk neutral and risk-averse would be 
compensated for job security. This compensation also increases as CEO’s risk 
tolerance decreases. Moreover, I find that job security loses its value when CEO is 
risk seeking. 
Fourth, CEO job market condition also has a significant impact on the 
compensation for job security. The firm-level job security loses its value under 
favorable job market condition. However, the result is mixed for industry-level job 
security. Overall, I find that this pay concession disappears under favorable job 
market condition. 
For the research in China, I conduct an exploratory study on the relationship 
between job security and CEO pay in China-listed firms by using a total of 1353 
hiring contracts. I show that CEOs in China do not take sufficient industry-level job 
risk. Although they do take firm-level job risk to some extent, I find no correlation 
between CEO compensation and firm-level job security. Overall, the impact of job 
security on CEO compensation is weak in China. These results reveal the lack of 
incentive pay and disciplinary mechanisms, underdeveloped professional executive 
market, and weak disclosure requirements problems in China. 
This study consists of seven chapters. 
Chapter 1 raises the questions that I address in this study, and provide the 
research background, research design and main contributions. 
Chapter 2 is literature review and theoretical analysis. Based on prior literature, 
we construct the logical relationship between CEO compensation and job security. 
Chapter 3 describes the institutional background of both the U.S. and China. I 
explain the development of the administrative regulations regarding executive 
compensation, and point out the current issues in China. 
















Job security measures are constructed in this chapter and tests are implemented to 
show that job security has a significant impact on CEO compensation. 
Chapter 5 investigates how CEO risk preference and job market condition 
modulate the compensation for job security.  
Chapter 6 is an exploratory study on the relationship between job security and 
CEO pay in China-listed firms. I also discuss the difficulties in current CEO 
compensation studies in China. 
Chapter 7 concludes and provides policy suggestion. 
This research addresses a topic of general interest, compliments several streams 
of literature and contributes in the following ways: 
First, this study provides extensive measures for job security based on both 
industry-level and firm-level information prior to the hiring event. This information 
includes past CEO tenure, reason for outgoing CEO’s departure, firm’s financial 
condition and performance. 
Second, this study also provides a more comprehensive analysis for CEO 
compensation than prior studies including the magnitude of pay, structure of pay, 
severance agreement, rate of disbursement, and the difficulty of obtaining such 
payment. 
Third, this study suggests that CEO compensation is a negotiation outcome 
between the CEO and the firm. Therefore, a relative risk preference between CEO and 
the firm, and job market condition should be considered in the theoretical model. This 
paper also contributes to the existing literature on determinants of CEO pay (Baber et 
al., 1996; Cadman et al., 2010; Cadman et al., 2013) and severance contract (Almazan 
and Suarez, 2003; Rau and Xu, 2013), and provides a new perspective on the 
determinants of CEO pay packages and the optimal design of managerial incentive 
contracts at firms in both the U.S. and China. 
Fourth, this study provides a new laboratory setting to study the value of job 
security in which it is exogenous. This setting occurs when a new CEO engages in 
pay negotiation at hiring. The degree of job security in these firms exists before pay 
















in CEO compensation studies such that setting CEOs can manipulate their own pays. 
Fifth, this research provides new ways to measure CEO risk preference. Using 
the CEO’s type of career advancement, employment status and expertise, I am able to 
categorize CEOs into different risk preference groups, and study how risk preference 
modulates the value of job security. On top it, I enrich the research by adding CEO 
job market condition and examine its impact on the value of job security. 
Lastly, this paper compliments the study done by Kaplan and Minton (2012) and 
explains why CEO compensation has increased while CEO tenure has decreased in 
the past. Moreover, this study also gives new answers for questions (how does CEO 
succession occur? Who will be selected as CEO?) asked by Cragun and Nyberg 
(2014). I provide evidences showing that CEO and firm with different risk preference 
can still be matched if the risk can be compensated.  
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